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INTRODUCTION 
The alcohol industry plays a strong role in American society and is 
responsible for over four hundred billion dollars in United States economic 
activity.1 It is both directly and indirectly responsible for creating 
approximately four million jobs in the United States, paying wages totaling 
almost ninety million dollars, and contributing roughly forty-one million 
dollars to state and local taxes in 2010.2 Of these numbers, the distilled 
liquor industry alone contributed to the creation of over one and a quarter 
million jobs, paid out almost twenty-nine million dollars in wages, and 
contributed fifteen and a half million dollars in state and local taxes.3 The 
United States is also the world’s leader in wine consumption.4 In the United 
States, there exist more than six thousand operating wineries, and the total 
value of their annual sales was thirty billion dollars in 2010.5 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Kevin Ryan Green is a law student at the University of Pittsburgh, J.D. Candidate 2015. 
1 Economic Contribution of the Distilled Spirits Industry, DISTILLED SPIRITS COUNCIL OF THE 
UNITED STATES, available at http://www.discus.org/economics/. 
2 Economic Contribution of Alcohol Beverage Industry 2010, DISTILLED SPIRITS COUNCIL OF THE 
UNITED STATES, available at http://www.discus.org/assets/1/7/ContributionFactSheet.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 2010 California/U.S. Wine Sales, WINE INST. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.wineinstitute.org/ 
resources/pressroom/02222011 (noting that in 2010, United States surpassed France as the world’s 
largest consumer of wine). 
5 Id.; Number of U.S. Wineries Continues to Grow, WINE BUS. MONTHLY (Jan. 16, 2010), http:// 
www.winebusiness.com/news/?go=getArticle&dataId=70601 [hereinafter Number of U.S. Wineries] 
(noting that there were 6,223 wineries in the United States as of November 2009). 
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Given the substantial and ever-increasing6 role alcohol plays in the 
United States economy and its citizens’ lives, this note will discuss the 
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holding in S. 
Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control.7 Here, 
the Eighth Circuit held as constitutional a Missouri law that only allowed 
for the licensure of alcohol wholesalers incorporated in the State, and 
whose officers, directors, and majority of owners are residents for a 
minimum of three years.8 The Court held this “residency requirement” to be 
permitted under the dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Given that state restrictions on competition may adversely affect the 
overall alcohol market,9 which is a large contributor to the United States’ 
economy, the Eighth Circuit’s holding in S. Wine is of great importance. In 
Part I, the Eighth Circuit’s holding and reasoning in S. Wine will be 
developed and discussed. Part II provides the historical backdrop of the 
Twenty-first Amendment as well as its precedential interplay with the 
dormant Commerce Clause. In Part III, the Supreme Court’s most recent 
Twenty-first Amendment case, Granholm, will be analyzed and explained. 
In Part IV, it will be argued that the Eighth Circuit erroneously applied 
Supreme Court case law. Part IV will additionally point out the negative 
consequences and implications that could result from S. Wine, as well as 
analyze important issues that were mentioned, but not ruled on in that case. 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 See Wine Consumption in the U.S., WINE INST. (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.wineinstitute.org/ 
resources/statistics/article86; 2010 California/U.S. Wine Sales, WINE INST. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www 
.wineinstitute.org/resources/pressroom/02222011. 
7 S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 
2013). 
8 Id. 
9 See MKF RESEARCH, LLC, The Impact of Wine, Grapes and Grape Products on the American 
Economy 2007, at 15 (2007) [hereinafter Impact on the Economy], available at https://www 
.wineinstitute.org/files/mfk_us_econ_report07.pdf (“The continuing consolidation in the distribution 
sector makes it increasingly difficult for smaller wineries to gain access to the market, especially the 
national market.”); Gina M. Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, Regulating Wine by Mail, REGULATION, Fall 
2004, at 30–31 (discussing that between 1984 and 2002, the number of licensed liquor wholesalers in 
the United States dropped from 1,600 to fewer than 600). 
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I. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN S. WINE 
A. Factual Background 
Missouri funnels liquor sales through a four-tier system, separating the 
distribution market into discrete levels: the first tier consists of producers 
(e.g. brewers, distillers, winemakers);10 the second consists of solicitors that 
acquire alcohol from the producers and sell it “to, by or through” 
wholesalers;11 the third tier is made up of wholesalers, who purchase 
alcohol from producers or solicitors and sell it to retailers;12 and the fourth 
tier consists of retailers who sell alcohol to consumers.13 
In Missouri, any individual or corporation who “manufacture[s], 
sell[s], or expose[s] for sale . . . intoxicating liquor” must first “tak[e] out a 
license.”14 To obtain a wholesaler license “for the sale of intoxicating liquor 
containing alcohol in excess of five percent by weight,” a corporation must 
be a “resident corporation.”15 Furthermore, to be a “resident corporation,” a 
corporation must be incorporated under the laws of Missouri, and all of its 
officers and directors must be “qualified legal voters and taxpaying citizens 
of the county . . . in which they reside” and have been “bona fide residents” 
of Missouri for at least three continuous years.16 In addition, “all the 
resident stockholders . . . shall own, legally and beneficially, at least sixty 
percent of all the financial interest in the business to be licensed under this 
law.”17 The residency requirement also contains a grandfather clause, which 
exempts corporations licensed as wholesalers as of January 1, 1947, or “any 
corporation succeeding to the business of [such] a corporation . . . as a 
result of a tax-free reorganization.”18 Only one nonresident corporation is 
licensed as a wholesaler in Missouri due to the grandfather clause.19 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.180.1 (2011). 
11 MO. REV. STAT. § 311.180.2 (2011). 
12 See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.180.4 (2011). 
13 See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.200 (2011). 
14 See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.050 (2011). 
15 See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3) (2011). 
16 MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.3 (2011). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 803. 
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Southern Wine & Spirits of Missouri, Inc. (“SM”) applied for a license 
to sell liquor at wholesale in Missouri.20 The Division of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control of the Missouri Department of Public Safety (“the 
Division”) denied the application, because SM did not satisfy a residency 
requirement.21 This is because Southern Wine & Spirits of America 
(“SWSA”), a Florida corporation, is a “distributor of wine, spirits, beer, and 
various non-alcoholic beverages, with operations in 32 states and the 
District of Columbia.”22 “Four Florida residents own over 97 percent of 
SWSA’s voting shares and more than 51 percent of all shares. SM is 
incorporated in Missouri and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SWSA. In 
July 2011, SM applied to the Division for a wholesaler-solicitor license.”23 
On its application, SM stated that its sole shareholder is SWSA, and 
that its officers and directors are Florida residents.24 The Division denied 
SM’s application because SM failed to “qualify as a resident corporation” 
within the meaning of the statute.25 The given corporation must not only 
become incorporated under the laws of Missouri, but also its officers and 
directors must be “qualified legal voters and taxpaying citizens of the 
county . . . in which they reside” and have been “bona fide residents” of 
Missouri for at least three continuous years immediately preceding an 
application for licensure.26 SM, its parent company SWSA, and four 
individuals thereby challenged the constitutionality of this residency 
requirement.27 
B. The Purpose of Missouri’s Residency Requirement 
The legislative history of Missouri’s Residency Requirement is scarce 
at best. On appeal, SM presented statements that were documented by two 
newspapers, which quoted the bill’s sponsor, Senator M.C. Matthes.28 Here, 
                                                                                                                           
 






26 MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.3 (2011). 
27 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 802. 
28 Id. 
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Senator Matthes explained to the General Assembly floor that his bill was 
“intended to prevent a few big national distillers from monopolizing the 
wholesale liquor business in Missouri. . . .”29 Two other news articles from 
1947, submitted by Missouri’s own amici, only underscored the 
aforementioned protectionist intent. The first separately reported on the 
very same statement by Matthes.30 The second quoted counsel for 
Missouri’s wholesalers, who stated the requirement, “protect[s] small 
businesses against huge corporations which threaten the small businessman 
in Missouri.”31 The news article also quotes a former state legislator who 
“attacked the bill’s constitutionality” and “said it was discriminatory.”32 
However, in looking to the plain language of the residency 
requirement, the chapter of the Missouri Code containing the Requirement 
includes a “purpose clause.” This purpose is “to promote responsible 
consumption, combat illegal underage drinking, and achieve other 
important state policy goals such as maintaining an orderly marketplace 
composed of state-licensed alcohol producers, importers, distributors, and 
retailers.”33 However, this provision applied to the entire chapter rather than 
just the residency requirement, and was also enacted sixty years after the 
residency requirement was adopted.34 
1. Discriminatory-Intent Claim Waived 
Unfortunately for SWSA et al., the Eighth Circuit deemed 
discriminatory-intent arguments waived on appeal, because Appellants 
failed to present the issue or pertinent evidence while at the trial level in 
front of the district court.35 The Court was not inclined to consider this 
argument in its discretion for the first time on appeal.36 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 807 (emphasis added). 
30 See Donnelly Is Urged to Veto Liquor Bill, JOPLIN GLOBE, May 10, 1947, available at http:// 
www.newspapers.com/newspage/38513306/. 
31 Governor Hears Liquor Men Tell of Pressurizing, JEFFERSON CITY DAILY CAPITAL NEWS, 
May 17, 1947, available at http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/2816198/ (internal quotations 
omitted). 
32 Id. 
33 MO. REV. STAT. § 311.015 (2011). 
34 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 809. 
35 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 807. 
36 Id. at 807–08. 
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Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution the Eighth Circuit stated 
several reasons why the SWSA’s discriminatory-intent argument must fail. 
First, the only evidence of discriminatory intent was a newspaper article, 
which the court qualified as being “rank hearsay.”37 Second, the article only 
described one legislator’s viewpoint, not the legislature as a whole.38 Third, 
even assuming the viewpoint was representative of the entire state 
legislature, the law’s assumed purpose of “prevent[ing] a few big national 
distillers from monopolizing the wholesale liquor business in Missouri” can 
be justified on permissible grounds, such as to promote social responsibility 
and public accountability among liquor wholesalers or to facilitate law 
enforcement.39 The Court also pointed to the later-enacted “purpose clause” 
of the statute, which stated the aforementioned reasons for discriminating 
between in-state and out-of-state wholesalers.40 
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Approval of the Residency Requirement 
With the discriminatory-purpose claim waived, the Eighth Circuit went 
on to analyze whether a state may require a wholesaler to be an in-state 
resident. Quoting the Supreme Court of the United States, the Eighth 
Circuit wrote, “[s]tate policies are protected under the Twenty-first 
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its 
domestic equivalent.”41 Here, the Court continued, “the proper inquiry in a 
Commerce Clause challenge to a state liquor regulation asks ‘whether the 
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers 
reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, 
notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal 
policies.’”42 
The Eighth Circuit held that States are permitted broad discretion in 
requiring “licensed in-state wholesalers”43 given this is an inherent part of 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808 (citing Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592, 603 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
38 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808. 
39 Id. 
40 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808–09 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 311.015 (2011)). 
41 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808–09 (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005)). 
42 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 809 (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275–76 
(1984)). 
43 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489). 
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the tier system, which is “unquestionably legitimate.”44 The only caveat to 
this general statement is that in licensing a state wholesaler, a State must 
give equal treatment to in-state and out-of-state liquor products and 
producers.45 Thus, finding Missouri indiscriminately limited the licensure 
of persons or businesses that meet its residency requirements, the law was 
found constitutionally permissible.46 
3. Missouri’s Residency Requirement Passed Rational Basis 
With the Eighth Circuit having interpreted Granholm as providing 
Missouri’s residency requirement a “protected” status,47 SM next argued 
that the constitutionality of the residency requirement in the wholesale-tier 
depends on a case-specific balancing of interests under the Commerce 
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment.48 Furthermore, SM contended 
that even if there were a bright-line rule established by Granholm for the 
wholesale tier, this only concerned “inherent” or “integral” aspects of the 
tier system, which do not intrude upon the residency requirement.49 To this 
end, for the residency requirement to be constitutionally permissible, a 
rational basis for the requirement must be found. 
SM maintained that the State’s assertion of legitimate interests were 
undermined by the deposition testimony of a deputy state supervisor for the 
Division, who was designated to testify on behalf of the Division.50 This 
deputy supervisor testified that he did not “think” the residency rule 
“impacts the distribution system,” because “we have a three-tier system of 
distribution,” and residency “doesn’t affect the distribution.”51 Furthermore, 
he agreed that allowing Southern Wine to be a licensed wholesaler would 
not erode the tier system or do anything to the current system because one 
non-resident corporation was already licensed due to the grandfather 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 808–09. 
47 Id. at 810. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
51 Id. 
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provision.52 Last, wholesalers also have “little impact upon” the “direct 
sale” of alcohol to minors, and that he could not “think of any” relationship 
between the residency requirement and the safety of Missouri citizens.53 
The Eighth Circuit rejected SM’s argument under the rational basis 
test. First, the Court reasoned “[t]here is no archetypal three-tier system 
from which the ‘integral’ or ‘inherent’ elements of that system may be 
gleaned. . . .”54 Second, even if there was such an archetype, Granholm 
cited the “in-state wholesaler” in connection with the very sentence, 
affirming that “the three-tier system itself is unquestionably legitimate.”55 
Thus, the Court concluded that in-state wholesalers are an “integral” part of 
the tier system, which are per se valid.56 
Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the Eighth Circuit went on to 
reason that even if Missouri’s residency requirement did not enjoy a 
“protected” status under Granholm, the Missouri law would pass a rational 
basis test.57 One rational basis the legislature could legitimately believe for 
making the requirement is that 
a wholesaler governed predominantly by Missouri officers, directors, and 
owners are residents of the community and thus subject to negative 
externalities—drunk driving, domestic abuse, underage drinking—that liquor 
distribution may produce . . . are more likely to respond to concerns of the 
community, as expressed by their friends and neighbors whom they encounter 
day-to-day in ballparks, churches, and service clubs.58 
Additionally the legislature could conclude the requirement helps facilitate 
law enforcement against wholesalers because it is easier to pursue in-state 
owners, directors, and officers, as opposed to out-of-state ones.59 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 810. 
55 Id. at 801 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489). 
56 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 801. The Court also cited Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 
2006) (“[A]n argument that compares the status of an in-state retailer with an out-of-state retailer—or 
that compares the status of any other in-state entity under the three-tier system with its out-of-state 
counterpart—is nothing different than an argument challenging the three-tier system itself. . . . [T]his 
argument is foreclosed by the Twenty-first Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Granholm[.]”). 
57 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810–11. 
58 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
59 Id. 
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While the Court noted that the deputy state supervisor “did not mount 
the most vigorous defense of Missouri’s law,” the witness did not disclaim 
the possibility that Missouri’s residency requirement furthers some of the 
interests asserted by the State. First, many of his comments were couched in 
his own knowledge and thoughts about the matter.60 Second, his remarks to 
some questions were directed at the impact of licensing SM alone, not at the 
effects of the licensing of unlimited out-of-state wholesalers.61 Lastly, some 
of the deputy supervisor’s testimony offered support for the Division’s 
asserted interest in ensuring community responsibility: “Some wholesalers 
do get involved in community action committees and things like that. So 
some of them do get involved in anti-drinking campaigns with various 
coalitions.”62 He also testified that the requirement “may serve” the State’s 
interest in promoting temperance, just “not as much as it used to.”63 
As for the grandfather clause and the one non-resident “grandfathered” 
wholesaler in Missouri, the Court held these did not undercut a rational 
basis for the residency requirement.64 The Court reasoned that Missouri’s 
legislature in 1947 could have reasonably chosen to incrementally address 
the perceived ills targeted by the residency requirement and to 
accommodate preexisting business interests while keeping the floodgates 
closed.65 The deputy director admitted that dealing with the nonresident 
wholesaler was sometimes difficult, but even absent a negative effect from 
the single nonresident wholesaler, this did not preclude the possibility that 
unlimited nonresident wholesalers could still pose a threat to legitimate 
state interests.66 
SM attempted to argue that the durational residency requirement of 
three years does not meet a rational basis. However, the Eighth Circuit 
deemed this argument waived because it was not developed in the district 
court or the opening brief on appeal.67 Furthermore, because SM’s officers, 
directors, and a super-majority of its shareholders are not current residents 
                                                                                                                           
 
60 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 812. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 812. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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of Missouri, the court refused to discuss the matter since no matter what the 
durational requirement may have been, no redress could take place.68 
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE 
As demonstrated in S. Wine, the central issue of lawsuits involving a 
state’s regulation of liquor is the tensions created by the Commerce Clause 
and the Twenty-first Amendment of the United States Constitution.69 For 
the purpose of setting out a background so as to better analyze the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding and reasoning, Part II(A) discusses the history of the 
Twenty-first Amendment and the subsequent adoption of the three-tier 
distribution system by the States. Part II(B) will then explain the function of 
the Commerce Clause and the “dormant” restrictions it places upon state 
regulation. Lastly, Part II(C) will discuss the Supreme Court’s precedential 
trend of more narrowly interpreting § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment as 
being subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. 
A. History of the Twenty-First Amendment and the Tiered Distribution 
System 
As drafted, the Eighteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution sought to prohibit “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation 
thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof for beverage purposes.”70 Yet, a catastrophic byproduct of the 
Prohibition was that illegal liquor trade flourished via illegal manufacturing 
and smuggling operations, which in turn resulted in the formation of crime 
syndicate operations.71 What is more, the rise of black markets and lost tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 812. 
69 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. amend. XXI; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 471 (identifying the 
central issue of the case as whether liquor regulations “violate[d] the dormant Commerce Clause in light 
of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment”). 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
71 RICHARD MENDELSON, FROM DEMON TO DARLING: A LEGAL HISTORY OF WINE IN AMERICA 
80–85 (2009). 
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revenues from the legitimate liquor trade exacerbated an already depressed 
economy.72 
Given these unintended consequences, Congress repealed the 
Prohibition via the Twenty-first Amendment,73 and since the Twenty-first 
Amendment’s enactment virtually every state has adopted a three-tier 
distribution system.74 The three-tier distribution system provides a 
framework in which alcohol producers (brewers) can only sell their 
products to wholesalers.75 Wholesalers, in turn, can only sell to retailers, 
who are finally able to sell to consumers.76 
The idea behind creating a three-tier system was to separate the 
“production” end from the “selling” end of the industry in order to curtail 
bootlegging.77 While there exists mixed criticism of the three-tier system, 
the Supreme Court has expressed that such is a valid exercise of state 
authority, which functions “[i]n the interest of promoting temperance, 
ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has 
established a comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its 
borders.”78 On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of the United 
States noted that the tiered distribution system is an “unquestionably 
legitimate” use of the state’s regulatory power.79 
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Constitution expressly grants Congress the authority to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”80 While the Commerce Clause does not explicitly prohibit 
certain State conduct and grants specific powers to Congress, the Clause 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 See generally Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1 (1994). 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI § 1; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488. 
74 Andrew Tamayo, What’s Brewing in the Old North State: An Analysis of the Beer Distribution 
Laws Regulating North Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2201 (2010). 
75 Id. at 2200–01. 
76 Id. 
77 Russ Bridenbaugh, The 3-Tier System: Is Anyone Happy?, WINES & VINES (Apr. 2002), http:// 
www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-85242685.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
78 N.D. v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990). 
79 See, e.g., Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting N.D., 495 U.S. at 432). 
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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has been read by the Supreme Court as implying a substantive constraint on 
the power of states to interfere with interstate commerce (“dormant” 
Commerce Clause).81 The Court has understood this interpretation as 
promoting the Commerce Clause’s purpose of preventing a state from 
retreating into economic isolation and thereby jeopardizing the welfare of 
the nation’s commerce as a whole.82 Thus, the Commerce Clause reflects a 
central concern of the Constitution’s framers that was an immediate motive 
for calling the Constitutional Convention, namely to avoid the tendencies 
toward economic Balkanization that had hampered symbiosis.83 
Given the backdrop of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has held that a state may not discriminate against 
interstate commerce in either effect or in purpose.84 Such discriminatory 
laws, presumed to be motivated by “simple economic protectionism,” face a 
“virtually per se” rule of invalidity.85 At a minimum, a state’s 
discriminatory law will be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard.86 Thus, 
a discriminatory law in purpose87 or effect will be held invalid unless it both 
serves a legitimate local purpose that cannot adequately be served by 
reasonable “nondiscriminatory alternatives.”88 Yet, absent a discriminatory 
policy in purpose or clear effect, a statute that “only incidentally” burdens 
interstate commerce will “violate the Commerce Clause only if the burdens 
they impose on interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.’”89 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (“[T]he 
[Commerce] Clause has long been understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the 
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”). 
82 Okla. Tax Com’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179–80 (1995). 
83 Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (citing Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)). 
84 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336). 
85 Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (striking down discriminatory waste management rule). 
86 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. 
87 McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (stating 
that the examination of statutory purpose may be relevant for deciding whether State regulatory conduct 
is discriminatory in nature). 
88 See Taylor, 477 at 151–52 (holding that a state’s public health interest in keeping diseased fish 
out of its waters was a rare example of legitimate local purpose that could not be served by 
nondiscriminatory means). 
89 See id. at 138 (quoting Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
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C. History of the Twenty-First Amendment’s Interaction with the 
Commerce Clause 
Given the limitations placed upon a state’s regulatory powers by the 
dormant Commerce Clause, absent a constitutional provision, alcohol is to 
be treated as any other article of commerce and subordinated to the right of 
free trade across state lines.90 However, matters were complicated with the 
enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment, in which § 2 reads, “[t]he 
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation 
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”91 The meaning of § 2 of the 
Twenty-first Amendment has proven historically elusive and much debate 
has ensued with regard to its purpose and meaning.92 
Looking to the language of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, the 
Supreme Court originally held that the amendment carved out an exception 
to the dormant Commerce Clause, whereby states were permitted to 
discriminate in interstate commerce for alcohol.93 Yet, by 1964, the 
Supreme Court substantially restrained the Court’s original reading of the 
Twenty-first Amendment.94 Here, the Court rejected as “an absurd 
oversimplification” the notion that states should be given full deference 
under the Twenty-first Amendment.95 Noting that “both the Twenty-first 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same 
Constitution[,]” the Court held that “each must be considered in the light of 
the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any 
concrete case.”96 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 See, e.g., Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 500 (1888) (holding Iowa law 
requiring permits for liquor importers unconstitutional). 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
92 See Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control over 
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 161, 180–81 (1991) 
(noting that the meaning of Section 2 is “incapable of precise divination” because congressional debate 
was ambiguous and there was no discussion at ratification conventions). 
93 See, e.g., Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939) (upholding retaliatory 
boycotts); see also State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936), 
abrogated by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460 (upholding discriminatory licensing fee). 
94 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 333–34 (1964). 
95 Id. at 331–32. 
96 Id. at 332. 
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A result of the Supreme Court’s restrained reading was that several 
state alcohol laws were struck down for violating federal law or for being 
unconstitutional.97 Yet, the current test used for analyzing a state’s 
regulation of alcohol was not laid out until 1984, in the Supreme Court 
decision Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias.98 In Bacchus, the Court held that for 
a discriminatory state law to prevail against the dormant Commerce Clause, 
it must be designed to promote a “central purpose” of the Twenty-first 
Amendment.99 Unfortunately, the Bacchus Court did not articulate this 
purpose.100 
D. Current Approach to the Twenty-First Amendment: Granholm v. 
Heald 
In 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States in Granholm v. 
Heald101 shed some light on how the Twenty-first Amendment interacts 
with the dormant Commerce Clause. Granholm dealt with two states, New 
York and Michigan, which enacted statutes limiting which wineries could 
ship alcohol directly to consumers within each state’s borders. Michigan’s 
statute was discriminatory on its face.102 Simply put, Michigan completely 
banned out-of-state wineries from directly shipping to consumers within its 
borders while allowing in-state wineries to do so as long as they had 
acquired the proper license.103 
However, the New York law at issue in Granholm was more complex 
given that it was not explicitly discriminatory in purpose. The New York 
law required all wineries to obtain a license with the State before they could 
legally ship wine directly to customers in the state of New York. However, 
                                                                                                                           
 
97 See, e.g., United States v. State Tax Comm’n of Miss., 412 U.S. 363 (1973) (striking down a 
Mississippi attempt to prevent a U.S. military base within its borders from obtaining cheaper alcohol 
out-of-state). 
98 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276; see also Kevin C. Quigley, Note, Uncorking 
Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination Principle to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1871, 1907 (2011). 
99 Baachus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 275–76. 
100 Id.; see also Quigley, supra note 98, at 1881. 
101 Granholm, 544 U.S. 460. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 473–74. 
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as the Court pointed out, to become a licensee a winery must have a 
physical presence in the state.104 
The Supreme Court of the United States first held the Michigan law as 
unconstitutional. Here, the premise of the Court’s holding was simple: 
“[S]tate regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle 
of the Commerce Clause.”105 Thus, reiterating the Court precedent that 
“[t]he central purpose of [§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment] was not to 
empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to 
competition,”106 the Court held both states’ statutes as unconstitutional.107 
Furthermore, while the Court called the three-tier system “unquestionably 
legitimate,”108 this statement was qualified, and it pertained only to 
situations where States “treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as its 
domestic equivalent.”109 
However, unlike the Michigan law, New York’s license requirement 
was at least neutral on its face. As New York argued, under its law, “an out-
of-state winery has the same access to the State’s consumers as in-state 
wineries: All wine must be sold through a licensee fully accountable to 
New York; it just so happens that in order to become a licensee, a winery 
must have a physical presence in the State.”110 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, stating that the law not only “grants in-state 
wineries access to the State’s consumers on preferential terms[,]”111 but also 
that “New York’s in-state presence requirement runs contrary to our 
admonition that States cannot require an out-of-state firm ‘to become a 
resident in order to compete on equal terms.’”112 
Given the discriminatory nature of the contested laws, which violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court then inquired as to whether the 
Twenty-first Amendment could save them.113 Here, to be held 
                                                                                                                           
 
104 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474. 
105 Id. at 487. 
106 Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276). 
107 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
108 Id. (quoting N.D., 495 U.S. at 432 (1990)). 
109 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
110 Id. at 474. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 475 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963)). 
113 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
278 (1988)). 
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constitutional, both laws must “advance[] a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.”114 The two legitimate local purposes advanced by New York 
and Michigan were keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and 
facilitating tax collection.115 Yet, both of these purported purposes failed to 
satisfy the Court’s requirement that the “clearest showing” must justify the 
discriminatory regulation.116 Looking to an FTC report and noting minors 
could just as easily order from in-state wineries, the Court held the first 
justification to fail strict scrutiny.117 Furthermore, the justification of 
facilitating tax collection failed strict scrutiny given that not only did there 
exist alternative nondiscriminatory means for achieving the objective, but 
also because in-state direct shipping posed a high potential for tax evasion 
as well.118 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN S. WINE 
While the Eighth Circuit in S. Wine concluded that Missouri was 
permitted to have a residency requirement, and that SM did not have 
standing to challenge the law’s durational requirement, the case nonetheless 
brings up important questions of law. First, whether requiring a company’s 
shareholders, officers, and executive to live in Missouri if they wish to do 
business in the state, is permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Second, whether a state can additionally require that company’s 
shareholders, officers, and executives to then stay in the state for at least 
three years and then remain there if they wish to gain and keep their license 
to sell alcohol. Last, whether a state’s discretion in implementing its three-
tier distribution system is truly “protected” and need only pass a rational 
basis test, unconditionally. In this portion of the paper, it will be argued that 
these questions must be answered in the negative. 
                                                                                                                           
 
114 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
115 Id. at 489, 493 (reiterating that States must regulate alcohol “on even-handed terms.”). 
116 Id. at 490 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 
(1994)). 
117 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490. 
118 Id. at 491. 
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A. Limits on a State’s Regulatory Power with Regard to Alcohol 
As discussed in Part III, the Commerce Clause serves the purpose of 
preventing States from retreating into economic isolation and 
Balkanization,119 which would jeopardize the welfare of the nation’s 
commerce as a whole.120 The Twenty-first Amendment did not draw an 
exception to this purpose,121 nor did it allow states to pass discriminatory 
laws dealing with alcohol, either in purpose or effect. For this reason, in 
Bacchus, the Twenty-first Amendment could not salvage a state law, which 
discriminatorily regulated alcohol.122 It is for this reason that states cannot 
use the three-tier distribution system as a means to negotiate which out-of-
state entities can sell alcohol in their state,123 nor can a state add extra 
burdens onto out-of-state wineries to have a physical presence within the 
state.124 Nor does the Twenty-first Amendment allow states to promote 
locally grown and produced alcohols over other out-of-state sourced 
alcohols,125 or fix the beer prices for out-of-state shippers based on 
surrounding state market prices.126 
The residency requirement involved in S. Wine pushes the limits as to 
how far a State may take its “unquestionably legitimate”127 power to 
regulate alcohol and require “licensed in-state wholesalers”128 within its 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. 
at 325). 
120 Okla. Tax Com’n, 514 U.S. at 179–80. 
121 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487 (quoting in part Brown—Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York 
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)) (“[This] Court has held that state regulation of 
alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause. . . . ‘When a state statute 
directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state 
economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further 
inquiry.’”). 
122 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490. 
123 Id. at 472 (“The rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate commerce follows also 
from the principle that States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or 
disfavored status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not attempt, to negotiate with other 
States regarding their mutual economic interests. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Rivalries among the 
States are thus kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is prevented.”). 
124 Id. 
125 Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276. 
126 Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
127 Healy, 491 U.S. at 808 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489). 
128 S. Wine, 731 F.3d 799 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489). 
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borders. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis is likely flawed. Granholm, in 
striking down the New York law as unconstitutional, clearly stood for the 
principle that even though a state may “require that all liquor sold for use in 
the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler[,]”129 this does 
not mean it can do so if it would burden the out-of-state entity in a way that 
does not affect an in-state entity.130 
Save for requiring all alcohol wholesalers to become incorporated in 
Missouri, Missouri’s residency requirement is much like the New York law 
involved in Granholm. The law, although uniformly applied to Missourians 
and non-Missourians alike, places a much higher burden on out-of-state 
residents to compete in the State’s alcohol market. Additionally, Missouri’s 
residency requirement creates less barriers to cross so as to qualify for an 
alcohol license. For instance, an out-of-state person applying for a license 
faces moving costs and the buying of property or rent that they would not 
otherwise have to deal with, and an in-state applicant will always be able to 
obtain a license before its out-of-state counterpart. What is more, 
Missouri’s law also places on out-of-state businesses the burden to move a 
large percentage of its shareholders to Missouri, make them residents, and 
keep them there for at least three years.131 
B. The Residency Requirement Applied Universally 
In Granholm, the Supreme Court explained that States may not 
implement protectionist policies or even enter into negotiated interstate 
agreements because “[r]ivalries among the States are thus kept to a 
minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is prevented.”132 It was for this 
                                                                                                                           
 
129 N.D., 495 U.S. at 432 (Scalia, J., concurring). Interestingly, Scalia’s concurrence and language 
is found in a plurality decision with four justices writing the main opinion, Justice Scalia writing a sole 
concurrence, and the other four justices concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was written 
Justice Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan. Justice Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Brennan did not join Justice Scalia’s concurrence. 
130 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487. 
131 All officers and directors must be “qualified legal voters and taxpaying citizens of the county 
. . . in which they reside” and have been “bona fide residents” of Missouri for at least three years. MO. 
REV. STAT. § 311.060.3 (emphasis added). “[A]ll the resident stockholders . . . shall own, legally and 
beneficially, at least sixty percent of all the financial interest in the business to be licensed under this 
law.” MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.3. 
132 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472. 
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very reason, in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a State law which fixed the price of beer sold in-state by 
out-of-state shipping companies to that of the price found in adjacent 
states.133 Utilizing a common-sense test for helping to determine whether 
State alcohol regulation violated the Commerce Clause, the Court 
explained: 
the practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering the 
consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged 
statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and 
what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar 
legislation. Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against 
inconsistent legislation arising from the protection of one state regulatory regime 
into the jurisdiction of another State.134 
If Missouri is constitutionally permitted to require all officers and 
directors of the company to be long-term residents of the state, then every 
state is allowed to pass similar legislation.135 Taken to its logical extreme, 
we enter a parade of horribles. Missouri’s residency requirement, in effect, 
requires out-of-state persons to permanently move to Missouri if they wish 
to gain license to wholesale alcohol in that state. Yet, if every state were to 
enact a similar law to Missouri’s residency requirement, that would mean 
alcohol wholesalers could never gain license in more than one state. 
Furthermore, even if a given wholesale corporation wished to move, they 
would also have to wait at least three years before they could gain a new 
license. 
This potential problem is not detached from reality. In Granholm, the 
Court discussed how, as of 2005, there were 13 states that had “reciprocity 
laws, which allow direct shipment from wineries outside the State, provided 
the State of origin affords similar nondiscriminatory treatment.”136 The 
Court explained, 
The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks generating the trade 
rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, 
in particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid. State laws that 
                                                                                                                           
 
133 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 467–68. 
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protect local wineries have led to the enactment of statutes under which some 
States condition the right of out-of-state wineries to make direct wine sales to in-
state consumers on a reciprocal right in the shipping State. California, for 
example, passed a reciprocity law in 1986, retreating from the State’s previous 
regime that allowed unfettered direct shipments from out-of-state wineries. Prior 
to 1986, all but three States prohibited direct shipments of wine. The obvious 
aim of the California statute was to open the interstate direct-shipping market for 
the State’s many wineries. The current patchwork of laws—with some States 
banning direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for out-of-state wines, 
and still others requiring reciprocity—is essentially the product of an ongoing, 
low-level trade war. Allowing States to discriminate against out-of-state wine 
“invite[s] a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very 
purpose of the Commerce Clause.”137 
In a twenty year period, the amount of states with reciprocity laws 
increased five-fold. Missouri’s residency requirement invites this same 
multiplication. For example, if SM still desires to obtain a license to sell 
alcohol, its four Florida residents who own ninety-seven percent of SWA 
must move out of Florida and reside in Missouri on a long-term basis. This 
way, SM can conduct business in both Florida and Missouri. However, if 
four Missourian shareholders owning ninety-seven percent of a corporation 
attempted to reside in Florida (or anywhere else), they would only be able 
to receive a license to sell alcohol in Florida. Thus, wholesale corporations 
desiring to conduct business in Missouri in addition to other states will be 
rationally compelled to reside in Missouri. In short, this means that any 
state that has a residency requirement has an interstate advantage over any 
state that does not. Thus, as this thought experiment demonstrates, 
Missouri’s residency requirement undermines the very purpose of the 
Commerce Clause, which is to prevent economic Balkanization that had 
hampered symbiosis amongst the states.138 
C. The Residency Requirement Would Fail Strict Scrutiny 
As argued in Part III(A) & (B), Missouri’s residency requirement is 
likely to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Thus, the next inquiry is 
whether the residency requirement can pass a strict scrutiny test, which 
                                                                                                                           
 
137 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473 (quoting, in part, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 
(1951)) (citations omitted). 
138 See generally Part II(B), supra. 
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looks to whether the law “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot 
adequately be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”139 
Here, Missouri carries the burden of making a “‘clear[] showing,’” based 
on “concrete record evidence,” that the discrimination is necessary and 
other alternatives are “unworkable.”140 
Missouri justifies its residency requirement on the grounds that 
a wholesaler governed predominantly by Missouri officers, directors, and 
owners are residents of the community and thus subject to negative 
externalities—drunk driving, domestic abuse, underage drinking—that liquor 
distribution may produce . . . [and] are more likely to respond to concerns of the 
community, as expressed by their friends and neighbors whom they encounter 
day-to-day in ballparks, churches, and service clubs.141 
Additionally, the legislature could conclude the requirement helps facilitate 
law enforcement against wholesalers, because it is easier to pursue in-state 
owners, directors, and officers, as opposed to out-of-state ones.142 
Like Granholm, where New York and Massachusetts “offer[ed] a 
handful of other rationales, such as facilitating orderly market conditions, 
protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory 
accountability,”143 under strict scrutiny, the Court will reject these 
arguments. In Granholm, the Court simply responded to these claims by 
saying that these goals could be ensured through an even handed licensing 
requirement.144 Yet, Missouri’s argument is even further weakened as 
compared with the arguments made in Granholm because of its own 
witness’s testimony. The Division’s own witness, the deputy state 
supervisor, testified he did not “think” the residency requirement “impacts 
the distribution system,” because “we have a three-tier system of 
distribution,” and residency “doesn’t affect the distribution.”145 
Furthermore, he agreed that allowing SM to be a licensed wholesaler would 
                                                                                                                           
 
139 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151–52 (holding that a state’s public health interest in keeping 
diseased fish out of its waters was a rare example of legitimate local purpose that could not be served by 
nondiscriminatory means). 
140 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490–93 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 393). 
141 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
142 Id. 
143 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492. 
144 Id. 
145 S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
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not erode the tier system or do anything to the current system because one 
non-resident corporation was already licensed due to the grandfather 
provision, and added that wholesalers also have “little impact upon” the 
“direct sale” of alcohol to minors, and that he could not “think of any” 
relationship between the residency requirement and the safety of Missouri 
citizens.146 Thus, Missouri’s residency requirement will not be saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in S. Wine stretches the State’s regulatory 
powers under the Twenty-first Amendment beyond its limit. Yet, with little 
to no case-law explicitly stating the limits of a State’s right to require 
wholesalers be in-state residents, lower courts are likely blind as to how 
they should rule when the law is facially uniform in nature. Here, it would 
be instructive for courts to look at whether the state law cuts against the 
core philosophy underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. If the Eighth 
Circuit had analyzed Missouri’s law in this way, the Court would have 
likely come to a different conclusion. First, Missouri’s residency 
requirement promotes interstate fragmentation—not harmony. Second, it is 
a law that compels business executives, officers, and shareholders to leave 
their current state, and it is a law that places heavier burdens on out-of-state 
wholesalers. Last, with an ever expanding interstate market for alcohol, 
which brings new challenges to local business operations, it is also a law 
that is likely to become multiplied across the states, which would likely 
have a chilling effect on the alcohol market. 
                                                                                                                           
 
146 Part I(A)(3), supra. 
